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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the 
present matter because it is an appeal from a criminal case 
decided by the First District Court of Box Elder County, that 
does not involve a capital or first degree felony, pursuant 
to Utah Code Annot. Section 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (1988). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a jury verdict finding Defendant 
guilty of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, 
Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a felony in the Second Degree, and 
Use of a Firearm. 
ISSUES 
A. Whether the trial judge erred in failing to give the 
jury an instruction of a lesser included offense of 
manslaughter . 
b. Whether the trial judge erred in denying the 
testifying of expert psychiatrists as to their opinion of 
Defendant's ability to form an intent on the day of the 
murder considering the amounts of drugs consumed by the 
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Defendant. 
c. Whether the trial judge erred in allowing an 
instruction to the jury as to accessories. 
d. Whether the trial judge erred in dissallowing 
cognitive memory recall and Defendant's reactions to 
questions Defendant answered clearly and concisely from a 
cert i fied hypnot her apist. 
e. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence upon 
which a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt can be justified 
which evidence .showed beyond question that the victim was 
shot by two separate guns at approximately the same time and 
evidence that there were third parties in the area partying 
at the time of the crime and evidence that Defendant may have 
been unconscious from the effect of drugs ingested. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV 
Utah Code Annot. Section 76-1-402 (1972) 
Utah Code Annot. Section 76-2-101 (1983) 
Utah Code Annot. Section 76-5-201 (1983) 
Utah Code Annot. Section 76-5-205 (1985) 
Utah Code Annot. Section 77-17-1 (1980) 
Utah R. Evid. 702 
Utah R. Evid. 703 
Utah R. Evid. 705 
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All are set out verbatim in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a decision on a second trial on 
the charges of Murder in the second degree, Theft of a Motor 
Vehicle and Use of a Firearm. 
b. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition at the Trial 
Court 
Defendant was orginally charged with Capital Homicide, a 
First Degiee Felony and following a jury trial the Defendant 
was found not guilty of capital homicide but guilty of Second 
Degree Murder and Theft, <* Felony of the Second Degree and 
use of a Firearm. Thereafter the Defendant moved for a new 
trial and the court gi anted the motion. At the second trial 
by jury, the Defendant was found guilty of Murder in the 
Second Degree, Theft of an Automobile, a Felony of the Second 
Degree, and Use of a Firearm. 
c. Relevant Facts 
On May 27, 1987, the Defendant and his companion, the 
victim, went to Villard Bcty to camp out for a few days 
(Record at 23, 31-12, o9-75 , 30-81, 102-104, 547, 563-66). 
On the night of the murder, the- victim and the Defendant were 
heavily involved in drug consumption (Record at 405-410, 
567-70, 84, 91 94, 99, 107-8, 550-3, 528-9, 533, 566-9). At 
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the same time that the victim and the Defendant were present 
at the scene where the murder occurred, there were other 
persons present who were partying and making noise (Record at 
413, 430, 446-8, 450-51, 459, 475, 4S7, 439). The victim in 
the middle of the night was shot in the head with two 
separate and different guns (.Record at 355-60, 413-14, 417, 
448, 472-3, 487, 485). The next morning the Defendant 
discovered the body, and feeling he could not explain the 
circumstances of the death, left the scene in the victim's 
vehicle (Record at 571-73) and picked up some other friends 
and traveled to the ^tate of California (Record at 573-75, 
118-20, 140-1, 146, 149-50, 182-99, 205, 207, 222, 228). 
Approximately three months later the Defendant was extradited 
from California and charged with the crimes herein (Record at 
286, 290-;). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The offense of manslaughter is a lesser included offense 
of second degree murder because proof of the elements of the 
greater necessarily include proof of tht lesser. Tht-re is 
sufficient basis in the record produced at trial to acquit 
the defendant of second degree murder btCduse of the 
ambiguity of the facts concerning who did the killing. 
Therf is also sufficient fctcts <r basis ir the facts to 
convict the defendant uf th^ lesser offense of manslaughter 
because the facts indicate that defendant was present and 
that the victim was killed in a felonious manner. 
The expert psychologist and psychiatrist who defendant 
sought to have testify were clearly qualified by the court as 
experts in their fields and knowledgeable to provide the 
analysis they were asked to peform. They testified that they 
could form an opinion as to the intent capability of the 
defendant based upon his testimony of the amount of drugs he 
ingested, and their experience with other drug users over the 
years in their practices. Thus the trial court was wrong in 
stopping them from testifying or giving their opinions as to 
the defendant's culpable state of mind. This was a key issue 
in the case that clearly went against the defendant. Once an 
expert is qualified he can base his opinion on what would 
otherwise be hearsay, as long as the basis is what other 
experts in the field would use to base their opinions on in 
the usual course of business. 
The trial court erred in allowing an instruction to the 
jury as to accomplices and accessories when there was no 
proof of any connection of the defendant with any other 
person or even of any forethought in the commission of the 
forbidden act. 
The trial court was wrong to not allow testimony by the 
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defendant as to which parts: of his testimony was hypnotically 
induced. In zo doing the tiial court denied the defendant 
his constit ut iunal light to testify on his- own behalf. The 
court misapplied th*- holding of the Utah Supreme Court 
against hyj. not i^ -diiy induced testimony pui on by the 
prosecution. 
The •state failed to prove the elements of the charged 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt because th^ -re was 
uncontroverted evidence at trial of two guns having been 
fired at the victim, the presence of other people at the 
scene of the crime other than defendant, and that defendant 
had been taking drugs during the i ime immediatly prior to the 
murder. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE THE JURY AN 
INSTRUCTION OF THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER 
In Utan tne code gives a criminal defendant protection 
from being convicted of two crimes a] icing out of the .same 
episode that are closely enough t elated in character ds to be 
proven by the giving «jf the same evidence. Further, when 
there is a rational bacis In ihe evidence foi acquitting the 
defendant of the charged uffense and convi-ting him of the 
lesser related offense he Is entitled to a jury instruction 
concerning the les:e. :fcense. A revl -wing court en appeal, 
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or the district court itself on motion, can overturn the 
conviction of the more serious offense and enter a conviction 
of the lesser included offense. Utah Code Annot. sections 
76-1-402(3) through (5) (1974). 
The code also demands that, 
"When it appears the defendant has comitted a 
public offense and there is reasonable doubt as to 
which of two or more degrees he is guilty, he shall 
be convicted only of the lower degree." Utah Code 
Annot. section 77-17-1 (1980). 
The Utah Supreme Court has said concerning the 
determination of whether a lesser included offense 
instruction is necessary, 
" . . . The analysis of whether an offense is 
included for purposes of deciding whether to grant 
a defendant's request for a jury instruction must 
therefore begin with the proof of facts at trial. 
If the same facts tend to prove elements of more 
than one statutory offense, then the offenses are 
related under section 76-1-402. The application of 
section 76-1-402(3) will thus require some 
reference to the statutory elements of the offenses 
involved in order to determine whether given facts 
are 'required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged.' . . . . Where two offenses are 
related because some of their statutory elements 
overlap, and where the evidence at the trial of the 
greater offense includes proof of some or all of 
those overlapping elements, the lesser offense is 
an included offense under subsection (3) (a)." State 
v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 158-159 (Utah 1983). 
-10-
The court went on to say that once it has been 
established that the two offenses overlap in evidence and 
4 
statutory elements, the court must decide " . . . Whether 
there is a sufficient quantaum of evidence to justify sending 
the question to the jury." Baker, supra., at 159. The Utah 
Supreme Court suggested an example of when the instruction 
should be given. 
11
. . . When the evidence is ambiguous and therefor 
susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one 
alternative would permit acquittal of the greater 
offense and conviction of the lesser, a jury 
question exists and the court must give a lesser 
included offense instruction at the request of the 
defendant. This situation will often arise when the 
critical question is either the credibility of 
certain evidence or the determination of what 
inferences may legitimately be made on the basis of 
the evidence. By assessing the evidence and 
deciding whether any interpretation of it would, if 
believed by the jury, permit conviction of the 
lesser offense and acquittal of the greater, the 
court preserves the weighing of evidence for the 
jury but is still able to protect the process from 
frivolous 'red herrings.'" Baker. supra., at 159. 
Applying the above holdings and rules to the present 
situation, it can be seen that the offense of manslaughter 
and second degree murder are included offenses. The statutes 
overlap in evidence required to prove the two offenses. Both 
statutes require the showing that the defendant caused the 
death of another. The main difference is the amount or 
degree of knowledge or intent that the defendant had at the 
time of the murder. Utdh Code Annot. sections 76-5-203 (1986) 
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and 76-5-205 (1985). Further the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that manslaughter is a lesser included offense of second 
degree murder. State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 790 (1984). 
In the present case as in other cases the prosecution 
has established that the victim died by a felonious act 
(Record at 306-313) and that the defendant was present or 
near at the time of the death (Record at 78-82). These 
elements are common to both manslaughter and second degree 
murder, thus establishing the lesser crime or its probability 
by the same or a portion of the same evidence required to 
prove the greater offense. 
The main question then, is whether there is a ''rational 
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense." Shabata. 
supra., at 790. The record indicates evidence that more than 
one weapon was used to shoot the victim (Record at 355-60, 
413), that there were third persons present who could have 
done the shooting (Record at 413, 430, 446-48, 449-464, 475, 
487, 489, 497), and that the defendant as well as the victim 
had been doing drugs probably the major part of the time 
surrounding the death of the victim (Record at 405-410, 529, 
551, 567-70). These facts established at the trial form a 
rational basis of acquitting the defendant of second degree 
murder. 
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There is a rational basis in the record for the 
conviction of the defendant of manslaughter. The 
Manslaughter statute requires that the defendant recklessly 
cause the death of the victim, or that the event occur due to 
the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance for which 
there is a reasonable explanation. Utah Code Annot. section 
76-5-205(1) (1985). The record establishes evidence that 
both defendant and the victim were engaged in taking drugs 
which is a risky thing that in itself could cause death, and 
which would make any other activity more risky for them. The 
record shows that the victim had a gun with him as well as 
other weapons (Record at 37, 46,83), which the parties had 
been using for killing fish. This activity of using 
dangerous instrumentalities to kill fish demonstrates a 
recklessness of danger that both parties should have been 
aware of, especially the added danger of using such 
instrumentalities when under the influence of drugs and 
alcohol. It is not a stretch of the imagination to say that 
the gun may have also been used to kill fish and that the 
parties did so. 
An additional indication of the applicability of the 
manslaughter charge to the defendant would be the evidence 
concerning one person singing out of tune and another yelling 
at him to quit, accorrrpdnied by the sound of guns being 
-13-
discharged (Record at 446-49, 472-75, 485-89). The fact that 
the gun was there has been established (Record at 37), as has 
been the fact that the parties were under the influence of 
drugs and alcohol (Record at 405, 407, 410, 529, 551, 
567-70). It is not uncommon for anyone to become angry at 
someone singing out of key in the middle of the night and to 
threaten or use undue force in such a situation. People that 
are inebriated often do sing out in disregard to those around 
them, while others1 tendencies to become angry are heightened 
by the consumption of alcohol. It would be a reckless act to 
have the gun around when the parties knew they would be 
taking drugs and drinking. It would also be even more of a 
reckless act to pick up a gun while inebriated and to shoot 
at someone in the night. 
Beyond the recklessness of the situation, it would be a 
reasonable explanation to say that someone while inebriated 
became extremely emotionally disturbed at the incessant 
singing off key by another, and thereby picked up the gun and 
fired it. The emotional disturbance can be reasonably 
explained or excused when one takes into consideration the 
drunken state of the defendant and the incessant singing of 
the off-key singer at the scene of the crime. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING QUALIFIED EXPERT 
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND PSYCHIATRISTS THE OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE THEIR 
OPINIONS ON DEFENDANT'S ABILITY TO FORM AN INTENT ON THE DAY 
OF THE MURDER 
-14-
The relevant rules pertaining to the admissibility of 
expert witness testimony in this or any case are: Rules 702, 
703 and 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 allows 
expert testimony when it will help the trier of fact to ". • 
. understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. , 
. .
M
 The expert must have been qualified by ". . . 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. . . .M 
In the present case the Psychologist and Psychiatrist 
were both qualified by the court as experts in their 
particular fields by training, and by their experience in 
dealing with drugs and persons addicted to them (Record at 
636, 644, 650-652, 670-673) and the court correctly stated 
that objections concerning their testimony would be more to 
the credibilty and weight than to their qualifications and 
that he would allow them to testify (Record at 650). This 
initial determination was in accord with the cases and the 
Rules of Evidence. State v^ Clayton. 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 
1982). 
Later on after hearing more about the basis of the 
testimony of the experts, the trial court held that the 
t^etimony of the defendant's witnesses was mere speculation 
-15-
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11
, . . A psychiatrist is perfectly aware of the 
fact that any history obtained from a patient may 
be distorted and self-serving.25 However, a 
psyciatrist is specifically trained to 'assimilate 
information from a wide variety of sources, to 
evaluate each fact, to discount some, to empphasize 
others, and to ignore still others. He then makes 
his own personal observations of his patient, puts 
everything together, and arrives at a 
conclusion. '26 Both the standards of the 
profession and a clinician's professional 
experience combine to form a basis upon which the 
psychiatrist can determine which clinical facts are 
pertinent to a professional opinion. Any flaws or 
failures in that examination or in the bases of the 
opinion can then be pointed out by incisive 
cross-examination. . , . 
Finally, and most importantly, the fact finder 
must be given the opportunity to make an informed 
judgment concerning the weight to be given the 
expert opinion. . . . " Schreuder . supra., at 1224. 
In this case the trial judge erred in not allowing the 
experts' opinions. He should have left the jury to make the 
decision concerning credibility and the weight to be given t 
the evidence to be presented. He usurped the province of th 
jury. As the Utah Supreme Court has also said and the same 
applies to this case because one of the expressed concerns o 
the prosecutor and the judge in this case was the testimony 
concerning x^robabilities , 
" . . . After a lengthy exploration of the methods 
and points of comparison used by the witness, the 
probability testimony based in part on 'the studies 
of others' was given to aid the jury in evaluating 
the hair comparison made by the expert witness 
himself. See Reeves
 t supra. The witness, in his 
own testimony on direct examination, exposed the 
weakness in the assignment of probablility figures 
when he said, 'I find it very difficult to put a 
specific number on that.' The defendant had ample 
opportunity to explore this weakness in 
-17-
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T T T
 THE TRIAL COURT ERREL lb A^^Jh^: . - . . : . . ^ . . ../TOM TO THE 
•tv^ERirv" ACCESSORIES OR ACCOMI - I J L J 
- 1 O 
The trial court allowed a.n instruction to the jury 
concerning accomplices or accessories over the objection of 
defendant's attorney (Record at 691). The instruction 
followed the language of the statute which states: 
"Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who 
directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally 
aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct.11 Utah Code Annot . 
section 76-2-202 (1973). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that " . . . It is 
prejudicial error to give an aiding and abetting instruction 
if there is no evidence of such activity , however, in this 
case the evidence presented to the jury supported such a 
instruction." State v. McCardell. 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court, has also said: " . . . The test for 
determing whether a person is an accomplice to a crime is 
whether the person could be charged with the same offense as 
the defendant.8 Prior knowledge does not make a person an 
accomplice when the person does not have the mental, state 
required and does not solicit, request, command, encourage, 
or intentionally aid in perpetration of the crime." State v. 
Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Utah 1986). 
In the present case there has been no other defendant 
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VI. 
The trial court stated that any evidence which was 
hypnotically produced would have been excluded and that the 
instruction was proffered because the defendant testified 
that some of his testimony had been hypnotically enhanced 
(Record at 691-2) . This would be applying the recent Utah 
Supreme Court ruling against the admissibility of 
hypnotically enhanced testimony in State v. Tuttle
 t 730 P.2d 
1203 (1989), to a defendant in an unconstitutional manner. 
The Utah Supreme Court expressly restricted its holding to 
the circumstance where the prosecution was seeking to admit 
hypnotically enhanced testimony against the defendant. 
Tuttle« supra., at 1211, note 9. 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Rock v. 
Arkansas « applys a case by case approach with the imposition 
of safeguards to insulate the testimony of the defendant from 
undue suggestion or pseudo-memory effects. Rock. supra., at 
2714. The U.S. Supreme Court also looked to traditional 
means of determining the accuracy of testimony, such as 
corroboration and cross-examination. Rock
 t supra., at 2714. 
A similar approach was advised by Justice Durham in her 
concurring and dissenting opinion in T u 111e, supra., at 1221. 
Th^ U.S. Supreme Court suggested the following procedural 
guidelines to reduce the infusion of suggestion: 
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entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted.'" Stat e v. Cobb. __ P.2d 
_, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 43, 46 (Sp. Ct. 1969). 
The stdte must prove that the defendant committed 
criminal homicide by " . . . intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental 
state otherwise specified in the statute defining the 
offense, causes the death of another human being. . , ." Utah 
Code Annot. section 76-5-201(1) (1983). To prove second 
degree murder the state must show that the defendant: " . . . 
(a) intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another, 
(b) intending to caus^ serious bodily injdry to another, 
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes 
death, (c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, he engages in conduct which 
creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes 
the deeith of another; or (d) while in the cornission, 
attempted commission, or immediate flight from M named 
felonies "causes the death of another person. . . ." Utah 
Code Annot section 76-5-203(1*) ^1983) . 
The Utah Supreme Court h_.s said: 
11
 . . . Second degree murler is based on a very high 
degree of moral culpability. That culpability 
arises either fiom an actual intent to kill or from 
a mental state that ir essentially equivalent 
-23-
L I I H I c b j - . iJ. : 11 a , : . , t u - u - l i i . g 
a n d k n o w i n g 1 y c i <_- 1 i n g v -_ i ; 
T h e r i s k o r d -_ a t h i n t h ^ 1.. 
1- t; S O y i - a i a ^ L 
. t I J I t'w'o i n s t a n c e s m u j t 
;uL.h u... i n d i i f e r e n c e t o 
l i f e J J t o I*.-- L _wi l a i i ' O L h L r .-. t h a t e v i d y t r : ^ d b y a r i 
i i i t f i i i L > I d ] i , . . . " ^SLLSSL >d_ :-~"] - ^ n d i r~ci •3. 
P . 2 d 2 t d , 2 .59 u f u i i 1 9 3 8 ) . 
T i ' i t c o a l t w e n t on : a y t h a t 
n i- '-: 1 e J iU.- n L. I..I I. ; I iv [ r a V -r '"I i t = 'I I I I t; L' •- L"i C •-:.: IV. U S i b e 
; a j : u b j e c i: i v e o v a 1 u a i i o n <.. £ t i"i e rn a g n 11: a d tr 
i: h e r i s k c r e a t e d a n d o f a i l t h <_- c i r c u r n s t a n c e s 
s u r r o u n d i n gr t h e k i l l i n g . B e d :.; i n g ^ r , 6 9 9 P . 2 d a t 
• a s t- a 
r o n r a n a >0 P. 2d at 1044 -4 i a oe a d o 
People v^ LcGrand, 61 A.Id2d 815, 4u2 N.Y.3.2d 209, 
c e r t . denied, 439 U.S. 335 (197b'< . . . . Clearly, 
depraved indifference is net proved by proof of a 
s L n g 1 e , mi atif i •:• i p a t e a z r a g i c r e s u 11 . R oisinger , 699 
P.2d at 1220. Depraved indifference means an utter 
c a i i o a s n K- s s t owa r a r: h « vai u e o f h urn a n 1 i f e and a 
complete and total indifference as to WJ; ft her oneds 
c onduct will cr •--a t e the r egui s i t e risk of death 
v, a i c u s s e a r< • . ov; ; a n o t h u L . 3 e e B o l s i n g e r . 6 9 9 
P . 2 d a t 
c orruTient 
2 2 0 ; K o d e i F e r i a l C o d e s e c t d o n 2 1 0 . 2 
. t J,..: b r a i d a n I E - v i s e d 
L . o i u i n e n t s I'.^O'jy 
i:^ 7 t h e a b o v e* s t ana._* i a.- e p r e s e n t c a s e i t ra: 
. " . n •  • i. i . i . . , ; '.r . i . - : u i i u i i t 1111 i i a "^ i i i i ; ;L n •_• c e s s ci r ± . y 
d t i L ' . - b d i n a r •=.• a s o n a b 1 e d o u b t a s : d . . b . ? -
S t a t r_- y __._ W a_t j . : , 6 7" 5 P . 2 d 5 6 6 , 5 0 b C.^L.ai:i 1 9 0 "• . Y i. ^ i ^ i s 
u n c o n t r o v e r t e d e v i d e n c e t h a t t w ^ g i n _ -; e r t- i d : t d a i ' 
v d" t b ; . (K e '• .J i d a i ' ; r r - t d r . « ..
 ; • . . . . d . . i, .^ 
a -_• i - a a a : i r. ,„t;
 A \ L , , r \ , . • r x ti v- - 1 ^ p i '_ s - u ^ a n a t. ,_. i i y d i _-, n c* .-J r L i'i e 
.J c e n t. '.. i T n t* a . u r d t j ' e n a t i d 'j h r v h o r u o v -c»i i^ v,? ^  j 1: i r :i '*: •'! t r i e 
i ; " (' . - - n a i j . L
 i ; . ia ...s • - d a 
2 1 -
substantial amount of diugs that night, or at least that he 
had been under the influence of drugs during the time 
previous to the killing (Record at 529, 551, 567-7C). 
Looking at the "magnitude of the risk," and nall the 
circumstances surrounding the killing," will lead on« to 
surmise that two friend* went away for a weekend so that one 
could get away from the pressures he ftit . They took drugs 
as on previous occasions* and had some fan fishing and killing 
trash fish. They may have got into an altercation in the 
night, and the victim may have engaged in a game of "Russian 
Roulette," or perhaps anothei party who could not stand their 
partying and singing jjhot the one who was ringing. The 
observer is left to wonder who shot the two different guns, 
what happened to the partying people parked near by in the 
van, and t ~> wonder if defendant did not in fact take too many 
drugs to remember anything as he claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant asks that his conviction of Second Degree 
Murder, Theft, a Second Degree Felony, and use of a Firearm 
be reversed, and the defendant be set at liberty. In the 
alternative, defendant asks for the Court to enter a 
conviction of manslaughter in the stead :i the Second Dcj:ee 
Murder conviction. riso al t ern :t iveiy +-he defendant asks the 
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Court to remand for a new trial, with the trial court 
receiving specific instructions as to allowing lesser 
included offense instructions, the allowance of defendant's 
expert testimony concerning his ability to form the requisite 
intent on the night of the murder, and the allowance of 
defendant's testimony concerning what portions of his 
testimony were hypnotically refreshed. 
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